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meetings. The Court recognized that
the possibility of student peer pressure
would still remain, however, this pressure presented little risk of official endorsement or coercion because no formal classroom activities were involved
and school officials could not actively
participate. [d.
Finally, applying the Lemon entanglement prong, the Court concluded that
the school did not risk excessive entanglement by complying with the Act. The
Act prohibited faculty monitors from
participating in the meetings, as well as
non-school persons from directing or
regularly attending the student religious
meetings. Moreover, school "sponsorship" of religious meetings was prohibited. [d. The Court again relied on
Widmar, stating that a denial of equal
access might create greater entanglement problems through invasive monitoring to prevent religious speech at
such meetings. [d. Accordingly, the
Court held that the Equal Access Act did
not violate the Establishment Clause. [d.
Two concurring opinions expressed a
different establishment premise. Justice
Kennedy concluded that the incidental
benefits realized by allowing official
recognition of a student religiOUS club
did not lead to an establishment of religion. He stated that nothing on the face
of the Act or the Westside facts demonstrated the presence of pressure to
participate in the religious club. [d. at
2376-77 (Kennedy,]., concurring). Justice Marshall offered a more cautious
opinion, stating that the school must
"fully disassociate" itself from the club's
religious speech, activities, and goals. In
his view, the school must also avoid the
appearance of sponsoring or endorsing
the club's goals. [d. at 2378 (Marshall,].,
concurring).
The Supreme Court's holding in Westside will have an immediate impact on
this country's school systems. Some
school districts have waited for the Westside opinion before deciding whether to
approve similar after-school student
clubs. Now, student religious groups
can demand equal access without fear of
violating the first amendment.
- Scot D. Morrell

Hodgson fJ. Minnesota: STATE
ABORTION LAW REQUIRING
TWO-PARENT NOTIFICATION
PRIOR TO A MINOR'S OBTAINING AN ABORTION IS CONSTITUTIONAL IF A JUDICIAL
BYPASS PROCEDURE IS
PROVIDED

In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct.
2926 ( 1990), the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Minnesota statute requiring that a pregnant minor notify both of her parents
before having an abortion. Although the
Court found the notification requirement itself to be unconstitutional, the
statute as a whole was saved because it
provided the alternative ofbypassing such
notice by obtaining judicial approval.
The Minnesota statute provided that,
with certain exceptions, an abortion
could not be performed on a woman
under 18 years of age until at least 48
hours after both of her parents were
notified. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2930.
This notice was mandatory unless 1) the
attending physician certified the necessity of an immediate abortion to prevent
the woman's death, 2) both of her parents had consented to the abortion in
writing, or 3) the minor declared that
she was a victim of parental abuse or
neglect and notice of her declaration .
was given to the proper authorities. [d.
The statute provided that if the court
enjoined the enforcement of the parental notice requirement, the same requirement would be effective unless the
pregnant woman obtained a court order
permitting the abortion. [d. To acquire
such a court order, the minor had to
convince a judge either that she was
"mature and capable of giving informed
consent" to the abortion or that an abortion without notice to both parents
would be in her best interests. [d. at
2932-33.
Agroup consisting ofpregnant minors,
clinics, doctors, and the mother of a
pregnant minor challenged the statute
by filing suit in district court. The group
alleged that the statute violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. [d. at 2934.
The district court found both the twoparent notification requirement and the
48-hour waiting period to be invalid,
and therefore concluded that the statute
was unconstitutional in its entirety and

enjoined its enforcement. [d. The
United States Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, reversed. The court determined
that the two-parent notification requirement was unconstitutional unless,
as in this case, a judicial bypass procedure was prOvided. [d. at 2935. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed. The Court held that the twoparent notification requirement was
not reasonably related to legitimate state
interests and was therefore unconstitutional, but agreed that the bypass procedure saved the statute as a whole. [d.
at 2947.
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that the due process clause's
constitutional protection against unjustified state intrusion into a woman's
decision whether to bear a child extended to pregnant minors. [d. (citing
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976». Since the Minnesota
statute placed obstacles in the pregnant
minor's path to an abortion, the state
had the burden of establishing its constitutionality; to wit, that the obstacles imposed were reasonably related to legitimate state interests. [d..
In considering the constitutionality of
the notification requirement, the Court
recognized that similar statutes containing parental consent or notification requirements had previously been evaluated by the Court and were determined
to be constitutional. The Court noted,
however, that none of these cases had
considered the significance of requiring
the notification of two parents, rather
than only one. [d. at 2938. Thus, the
Court focused its analysis on this distinction.
In defending the statute, the state
relied primarily on the state's interest in
protecting the independent right of
parents "to determine and strive for
what they believe to be best for their
children," and not on the best interests
of the minor. [d. at 2946. While the
Court recognized that such an interest
may be legitimate, it found that it would
be fully served by a requirement that the
minor notify one parent. [d. at 2945.
The Court determined that in functioning families, where the parents communicate with each other, notice to one
parent would normally constitute notice
to both and the two-parent notification
requirement would therefore be unnec-
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essary and would not serve any legitimate state interest. Id. Moreover, in
"dysfunctional" families, where the parents were divorced or the second parent
otherwise did not participate in the
upbringing of the child, the Court found
that the requirement actually disserved
the state's interest in protecting and
assisting the minor. Id The Court noted
that the record revealed the two-parent
notification requirement to often result
in major trauma to the child as well as
the parent, and to violate the privacy of
the parent and child even when they
suffered no other physical or psychological harm. Id. The Court wrote: "The
state has no more interest in requiring
all family members to talk with one
another than it has in requiring certain
ofthem to live together... [n ]or can any
state interest in protecting a parent's
interest in shaping a child's values and
lifestyle overcome the liberty interests
of a minor acting with the consent of a
single parent or court." Id. at 2946. The
Court found that the separate interest of
one parent combined with the minor's
privacy interest outweighs the separate
interest of the second parent. The Court
therefore held the two-parent notification requirement, standing alone, to be
unconstitutional.Id. at 2947.
The Court concluded, however, that
the bypass procedure provided in the
statute rendered the entire statute constitutional. Id. The Court noted
the district court's finding that the bypass procedure produced fear and anxiety among minors and that, of the
judges who adjudicated 90% of the
bypass petitions in 1981, none identified any positive effects of the law. Id. at
2940. However, the Court followed precedent set by earlier cases wherein the
Court determined that statutes requiring parental consent to a minor's abortion would be upheld so long as they
provided an alternative procedure
"whereby a minor may demonstrate that
she is sufficiently mature to make the
abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would
be in her best interests." Id. at 2948
(citing Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462
u.s. 467, 491 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 u.s. 622, 643-644 (1979)).
Turning to the constitutionality of the
statute's 48-hour waiting period, the
Court recognized concerns expressed
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by the district court that such a waiting
requirement might delay the abortion
and thereby increase the risk of the
abortion procedure, but found the waiting period itself to be reasonable and to
impose a minimal burden on the mother's
right to decide whether to terminate the
pregnancy. The Court stated:
"The brief waiting period provides
the parent the opportunity to consult with his or her spouse and a
family physician, and it permits the
parent to inquire into the competency of the doctor performing the
abortion, discuss the religiOUS or
moral implications of the abortion
decision, and provide the daughter needed guidance and counsel
in evaluating the impact of the
decision on her future."
Id. at 2944.
Through this decision, the Supreme
Court has authorized states to impose
upon a minor seeking an abortion the
additional burden of either notifying
both of· her parents, regardless of
whether one is alienated or disinterested, or obtaining the approval of a
judge who has little or no knowledge of
her circumstances. In that the Supreme
Court has approved the mechanism of a
judicial bypass procedure to render an
otherwise invalid statute constitutional,
one may only speculate as to future
unconstitutional statutory obstacles
which may be placed in a pregnant
minor's path so long as similar judicial
alternatives are prOvided.
- Rikke Davis

Maryland v. Craig: MARYLAND
STATUTE ALLOWING ONE-WAY
CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION
TESTIMONY OF CHILD ABUSE
VICTIMS DID NOT VIOLATE THE
CONFRONT ATION CLAUSE OF
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
In Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157
( 1990), the United States Supreme Court
upheld a Maryland statute providing for
one-way closed circuit television testimony by an alleged child abuse victim.
The decision overruled the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, which held that
the State's showing of the necessity to
prevent eye-to-eye confrontation was
insufficient to invoke the statute's protection.
Sandra Ann Craig was indicted in
October, 1986 by a Maryland grand jury

on various counts of child and sexual
abuse. Six year old Brooke Etze, the
named victim in each count had attended
a preschool and kindergarten center
owned and operated by Craig.
Prior to the case proceeding to trial,
state prosecutors attempted to invoke a
Maryland statutory procedure that allowed a judge to permit testimony of an
alleged child abuse victim by one-way
closed circuit television. Section 9-102
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article provided that the trial judge
must first "determin[e] that the testimony by the child victim in the courtroom [WOUld] result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that
the child [could not] reasonably communicate." Id. at 3161 n.1 (quoting
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann.
§ 9-102(a)( 1 )(ii) (1989)). Once such
a determination was made, the child
witness, the state prosecutor, and the
defense counsel would proceed to a
separate room while the judge, the jury,
and the defendant remained in the courtroom. The child witness would then be
subject to direct examination by the
state's attorney, cross-examination by
the defendant's attorney, and any questions the judge might wish to ask the
child. The examination would be recorded bya video monitor which simultaneously displays the witness' testimony in the courtroom. According to
the procedure, the defendant would
remain in communication with his attorney, but not with the child witness.
Any objections made by either attorney
would be ruled on by the judge in the
courtroom.
In support of its invocation of the
statutory procedure, the state's attorney
offered expert testimony that Brooke,
testifying in Craig's presence, would
have suffered the required serious emotional distress such that she could not
have reasonably communicated. Craig
objected, arguing that the procedure violated the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The trial court rejected
that challenge, stating that while the
procedure took away the physical confrontation between the witness and the
accuser, the statute preserves the "essence" of the constitutional right. The
procedure allowed the defendant the
right to observe, cross-examine, and

